Economics Institute for Competition Law Judges (Madrid)


EVENT DETAILS

  • Date: Sunday, May 22 to Friday, May 27, 2022
  • Location: Madrid, Spain

February 11, 2022

The Global Antitrust Institute (GAI) is pleased to invite you to participate and collaborate in the Antitrust Economics Institute for Competition Law Judges, to be held during Ascension Week, Sunday, May 22 to Friday, May 27, 2022, in Madrid, Spain. The Economics Institute will be offered in English only.

The draft agenda for the Institute can be found below. If you participated in 2019 at the Lisbon Institute, you are welcome to join us in Madrid 2022, as 50% of the sessions are either brand new or significantly refreshed.

The Institute is limited to approximately twenty-five judges to allow for active engagement and exchange of experiences. Each participating and collaborating judge will be expected to read the materials, engage, and share experiences and viewpoints from his or her own jurisdiction. The unique experience and knowledge that each judge contributes to the Institute are critical. The collaboration with the GAI faculty generates significant and tangible benefits and value to our research and scholarship in the form of academic articles and competition advocacy. Please see the SSRN page of each faculty member listed on the attached flyer for examples of research and scholarship that the GAI generates as a result of our learning and interaction with competition judges and enforcers worldwide.

Materials for the Economics Institute, hotel rooms (from Sunday night through Friday morning), and group meals are covered by the GAI. Airfare and airport transportation to and from the Institute venue will also be provided at no cost to you when booked though our approved travel agency.

To secure a place in the Institute, please contact Amanda Olsavsky Hu, our Program Manager, at gai@gmu.edu to register.  Also, please feel free to invite a fellow judge to join you.

We look forward to collaborating with judges of the European Court of Justice, the European General Court, the courts of EU Member States, and of the United States in Madrid. In the meantime, we are happy to answer any questions you may have about the GAI or the Economics Institute.

All the best,

Douglas H. Ginsburg
Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
Co-Founder and Chair, GAI International Board of Advisors
Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School


About Us:

The Global Antitrust Institute, which is a division of the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University, was founded in 2014 based upon the belief that when the policy-makers, agency officials, and judges responsible for interpreting and applying competition law better understand economics, they are more likely to make decisions that promote consumer welfare and innovation. The GAI promotes the application of sound economic analysis to competition enforcement around the world through research, scholarship and competition advocacy. Our Economic Institutes are a critical part of our own learning process and research into antitrust institutions.

The GAI Economics Institute:

The following members of the Antonin Scalia Law School faculty will participate in the program:

    • Joshua D. Wright, J.D., Ph.D. Economics; Executive Director, GAI; University Professor, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; and former Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission (https://papers.ssrn.com/author=466576)
    • Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg, J.D.; Chair, International Board of Advisors, GAI; Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; and former head of the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (https://papers.ssrn.com/author=40531)
    • Bruce H. Kobayashi, Ph.D., Economics; Director, Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics; Senior Scholar and Founding Director, GAI; and Paige V. and Henry N. Butler Chair in Law and Economics, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University (https://papers.ssrn.com/author=16451)
    • John M. Yun, Ph.D., Economics; Deputy Executive Director, GAI; Associate Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University; and former Acting Deputy Assistant Director in the Bureau of Economics, U.S. Federal Trade Commission (https://papers.ssrn.com/author=366191)

AGENDA (as of February 10, 2022)

* Draft – Subject to Change *

Sunday, May 22
Arrival and Welcome Dinner

6:00 to 8:00 – Welcome Reception & Opening Dinner

Monday, May 23
Introduction to Economics & Markets

7:00 to 8:30 – Breakfast

8:30 to 9:00 – Session 1: Goals of Antitrust | Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg

        • Readings Assignments:
          – Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 Fordham L. Rev.2405 (2013).

9:00 to 10:15 – Session 2 – Demand & Supply | Bruce H. Kobayashi

        • Reading Assignments:
          – Heyne et al., The Economic Way of Thinking, Chapters 3 & 4.
          – Butler et al., Economic Analysis for Lawyers (2014), Chapter IX, pp. 481-92.

10:30 to 11:45 – Session 3: Equilibrium, Markets, and Prices | John M. Yun

        • Reading Assignments:
          – Heyne et al., The Economic Way of Thinking, Chapter 5.

11:45 to 12:45 – Lunch

12:45 to 2:00 – Session 4: Basic Models of Competition | Joshua D. Wright

        • Reading Assignments:
          – Heyne et al., The Economic Way of Thinking, Chapter 9.
          – Butler et al., Economic Analysis for Lawyers (2014), Chapter IX, pp. 492-507, 517-519, 523-526, 537.
Tuesday, May 24
Price Discrimination, Market Power, & Horizontal Mergers

7:00 to 8:30 – Breakfast

8:30 to 9:45 – Session 5: Price Discrimination, Tying, & Bundling | James C. Cooper, Associate Professor of Law and Director, Program on Economics & Privacy, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University

        • Reading Assignments:
          – Butler et al., Chapter IX.B.2.c (pp. 513-515)
          – Mankiw, Chapter 15 (pp. 314-318)
          – Hal Varian, Differential Pricing and Efficiency, 1 First Monday 1 (1996)

10:00 to 11:15 – Session 6: Tools to Assess Market Definition & Market Power | Yun

        • Reading Assignments:
          – Benjamin Klein, Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis After Kodak, 3 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 43, 71-82 (1993).
          – Jonathan Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 Antitrust L.J. 129 (2007)

11:30 to 12:45 – Session 7: Horizontal Mergers: Unilateral Effects | Wright

        • Reading Assignments
          – Carl Shapiro, Mergers with Differentiated Products, Antitrust 23 (1996).
          – Charles River Associates, Scoring Unilateral Effects with the GUPPI: The Approach of the New Horizontal Merger Guidelines, CRA Competition Memo (2010).

12:45 to 1:45 – Lunch

1:45 to 3:00 – Session 8: Horizontal Mergers: Coordinated Effects | Kobayashi

        • Reading Assignments
          – Janusz Ordover, Coordinated Effects, in 2 Issues in Competition L. & Pol’y 1359 (2008).

6:00 to 8:00 – Group Activity and Dinner

Wednesday, May 25
Vertical Controls, Exclusivity, & Vertical Mergers

7:00-8:30         Breakfast

8:30 to 9:45 – Session 9: Vertical Controls: Fundamentals | Ginsburg

        • Reading Assignments
          – Benjamin Klein, Competitive Resale Price Maintenance in the Absence of Free Riding, 76 Antitrust L.J. 431 (2009).
          – Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Exclusive Contracts and Vertical Restraints: Empirical Evidence and Public Policy, in Handbook of Antitrust Economics 391 (Buccirossi ed., 2008).

10:00 to 11:15 – Session 10: Exclusive Deals & Most-Favored Nation (MFN) Clauses | Kobayashi

        • Reading Assignments
          – Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Exclusive Dealing: Before, Bork, and Beyond, 57 J.L. & Econ. S145 (2014).
          – Dennis W. Carlton & Ken Heyer, Extraction vs. Extension: The Basis for Formulating Antitrust Policy Towards Single-Firm Conduct, 4 Competition Pol’y Int’l 285 (2008).
          – Margherita Colangelo, Traditional and Platform MFN Clauses Under Antitrust Law: Insights from Recent Practice, CPI Antitrust Chronicle, Sep. 2019.

11:30 to 12:45 – Session 11: Vertical Mergers: Theory | Wright

        • Reading Assignments
          – 2020 DOJ & FTC Merger Guidelines
          – Russell Pittman, Three Economist’s Tools for Antitrust Analysis, EAG Discussion Paper 17-1 (2017).
          – Jonathan B. Baker, Comcast/NBCU: The FCC Provides a Roadmap for Vertical Merger Analysis, 25 Antitrust36 (2011).12:45 to

12:45 to 1:45 – Lunch

1:45 to 3:00 – Session 12: Vertical Mergers: Empirical Evidence | Cooper

        • Reading Assignments
          – Francine Lafontaine & Margaret Slade, Vertical Integration and Firm Boundaries: The Evidence, 45 J. Econ. Literature 629, 629 (2007).
          – Marissa Beck & Fiona Scott Morton, Evaluating the Evidence of Vertical Mergers, 59 Rev. Industrial Org. 273 (2021).
Thursday, May 26
Network Effects, Platforms, & Digital Markets

7:00 to 8:30 – Breakfast

8:30 to 9:45 – Session 13: The Economics of Network Effects & Platforms | Yun   

        • Reading Assignments
          – David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 Yale J. on Reg. 325 (2003)
          – Catherine Tucker, What Have We Learned in the Last Decade? Network Effects and Market Power, 32 Antitrust77 (2018).
        • Suggested Additional Reading:
          – Marc Rysman, The Economics of Two-Sided Markets, 23 J. Econ. Persp. 125 (2009).

10:00 to 11:15 – Session 14: Unilateral Conduct, Platforms, & Amex | Wright

        • Reading Assignments
          – Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274, 2284 (2018).
          – Joshua D. Wright & John M. Yun, Burdens and Balancing in Multisided Markets: The First Principles Approach of Ohio v. American Express, 54 Rev. Indus. Org. 717 (2019).

11:30 to 12:45 – Session 15: Understanding United States v. Microsoft | Ginsburg

        • Reading Assignments
          – United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
          – Michael D. Whinston, Exclusivity and Tying in US v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don’t Know, 15 J. Econ. Persp. 63 (2001).

12:45 to 1:45 – Lunch

1:45 to 3:00 – Session 16: Antitrust & Intellectual Property | Kobayashi

        • Reading Assignments
          – Bruce H. Kobayashi, Joshua D. Wright, Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joanna Tsai, Actavis and Multiple ANDA Entrants: Beyond the Temporary Duopoly, 29 Antitrust 89 (2015).
          – DOJ & FTC Antitrust Guidelines for The Licensing of Intellectual Property (2017).

6:00 to 8:00 – Closing Reception & Dinner

Friday, May 27
Information & Privacy

7:00 to 8:30 – Breakfast

8:30 to 9:45 – Session 17: Introduction to the Economics of Information | Yun

        • Reading Assignments
          – Butler et al., Chapter V.A-B (pp. 231-242)
          – Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1969).

10:00 to 11:15 – Session 18: Privacy as a Competition Value | Cooper

        • Reading Assignments
          – Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis Taylor, & Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. Econ. Lit. 442, 442-49 (2016)
          – James C. Cooper, Privacy and Antitrust: Underpants Gnomes, the First Amendment, and
          – Subjectivity, 20 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1129 (2013).

11:15 – Adjourn & Take-Home Lunch