General Approach

• Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Whither Symmetry? Antitrust Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights at the FTC and DOJ, 9 Cᴏᴍᴘᴇᴛɪᴛɪᴏɴ Pᴏʟ’ʏ Iɴᴛ’ʟ 41 (2013)

Patent Holdup and Holdout

• Anne Layne-Farrar, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking Theory and Evidence: Where Do We Stand After 15 Years of History? (Dec. 2014)
• Alexander Galetovic et al., An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-Up 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 21090, Apr. 2015)
• Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 34 Eᴄᴏɴ. Iɴǫᴜɪʀʏ 444 (1996)
• Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriate Rents, and Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L & Eᴄᴏɴ. 297 (1978)

Market Power

• Anne Layne-Farrar & A. Jorge Padilla, Assessing the Link Between Standards and Patents, in Innovations in Organizations IT Specification and Standards Development 19 (Kai Jacobs ed., 2013)

Refusals to License and Tying and Bundling

• Jorge Padilla & Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Portfolio Licensing at the End-User Device Level: Analyzing Refusals to License FRAND-Assured Standard-Essential Patents at the Component Level,” 62 Aɴᴛɪᴛʀᴜsᴛ Bᴜʟʟ. (forthcoming 2017).
• Anne Layne-Farrar & Michael A. Salinger, Bundling of RAND-Committed Patents, Social Science Research Network (December 2015)

The “Nondiscriminatory” Prong of FRAND

• Anne Layne-Farrar, Nondiscriminatory Pricing: Is Standard Setting Different?, 6 J. Cᴏᴍᴘᴇᴛɪᴛɪᴏɴ L. & Eᴄᴏɴ. 4 (Dec. 2010)

Excessive Pricing, the Optimal Royalty Base, and Royalty Stacking

• Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., Excessive Royalty’ Prohibitions and the Dangers of Punishing Vigorous Competition and Harming Incentives to Innovate, Cᴏᴍᴘᴇᴛɪᴛɪᴏɴ Pᴏʟ’ʏ Iɴᴛ’ʟ (March 2016)
• Gerard Llobet & Jorge Padilla, The Optimal Scope of the Royalty Base in Patent Licensing, 59 J.L & Eᴄᴏɴ. 45 (2016)
• Alexander Galetovic & Kirti Gupta, Royalty Stacking and Standard Essential Patents: Theory and Evidence from the World Mobile Wireless Industry (Stanford Univ. Hoover Institution Working Grp. on Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Prosperity, Working Paper Series No. 15012, 2015)
• J. Gregory Sidak, Evading Portfolio Royalties For Standard-Essential Patents Through Validity Challenges, 39 Wᴏʀʟᴅ Cᴏᴍᴘᴇᴛɪᴛɪᴏɴ 191 (2016)

Injunctive Relief

• Koren W. Wong-Ervin & Joshua Wright, Intellectual Property and Standard Setting Organizations, 17 Fᴇᴅᴇʀᴀʟɪsᴛ Sᴏᴄ’ʏ Rᴇᴠ., no. 3, 2016, at 52 (2016)
• Douglas H. Ginsburg et al., The Troubling Use of Antitrust to Regulate FRAND Licensing, CPI Antitrust Chronicle (Oct. 2015)
• Douglas H. Ginsburg, Taylor M. Owings & Joshua D. Wright, Enjoining Injunctions: The Case Against Antitrust Liability for Standard Essential Patent Holders Who Seek Injunctions, The Antitrust Source at 5-6 (Oct. 2014)
• Joanna Tsai & Joshua D. Wright, Standard Setting, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Role of Antitrust in Regulating Incomplete Contracts, 80 Aɴᴛɪᴛʀᴜsᴛ L.J. 157 (2015)
• Anne Layne-Farrar, Proactive or Reactive? An Empirical Assessment of IPR Policy Revisions in the Wake of Antitrust Actions (2013)

Extra-Jurisdictional Remedies

• Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Joshua D. Wright, Bruce H. Kobayashi, & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Extra-Jurisdictional Remedies Involving Patent Licensing, Cᴏᴍᴘᴇᴛɪᴛɪᴏɴ Pᴏʟ’ʏ Iɴᴛ’ʟ (Dec. 2016)