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- Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Lᴇɢᴀʟ Sᴛᴜᴅ. 833 (1994)
- Robert Innes, Self-Policing and Optimal Law Enforcement when Violator Remediation is Valuable, 107 J.L & Eᴄᴏɴ. 1305 (1999)
- Robert Innes, Violator Avoidance Activities and Self-Reporting in Optimal Law Enforcement, 17 J.L. Eᴄᴏɴ. & Oʀɢ. 239 (2001)
- Barbara McCutcheon, Do Meetings in Smoke-Filled Rooms Facilitate Collusion?, 105 J. Pᴏʟ. Eᴄᴏɴ. 330 (1997)
